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DEDUCTIBLE TAX PLANNING EXPENSES:
THE SCOPE OF INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE SECTION 212-3
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for
example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession:
cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception-
couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of-
leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important,
but successfully concealed purport, which it is my duty to extract,
but which is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordi-
nate expenditure of time. I know these monsters are the result of
fabulous industry and ingenuity, plugging up this hole and cast-
ing out that net, against all possible evasion .... (emphasis added)
Learned Hand
57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947-48)
To Learned Hand, the Internal Revenue Code presented an in-
geniously created monster whose complexity remained shrouded in
abstract language. The language of the Code may well be abstract,
but its impact is very real. For this reason, much effort is ex-
pended by the American taxpayer to assess if not reduce his tax
burden.' The extent and character of such effort is often corre-
lated to the complexity of an individual's affairs. For a majority
of taxpayers, the completion of an annual tax return, either indi-
vidually or by a tax service, is the sum and substance of tax-related
expenditures. For others, professional guidance is sought out,
either on a temporary or permanent basis, to plan and devise tax-
saving strategies prior to the completion of taxable transactions
and incurrence of expenditures.
The deductibility of such tax-related expenses, be it tax re-
1. I looked for a loophole, but there did not appear to be any.
I am acquainted with a very opulent man whose house is a
palace; whose table is regal; whose outlays are enormous; yet a
man who has not income, as I have often noticed by the revenue
returns. And to him I went for advice in my distress.
He took my dreadful exhibition of receipts, he put on his glasses,
he took his pen, and presto-I was a pauper. It was the neatest
thing that ever was. He did it simply by deftly manipulating the
bill of deductions.
Letter from Mark Twain, 1870, in Thrower, Administering the Tax Laws in
a Changing Society, 47 TAxEs 729, 730 (1969).
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turn service or sophisticated tax planning counsel, depends primar-
ily upon the applicability of Internal Revenue Code section 212(3)
which provides:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses, paid or incurred during
the taxable year...
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund
of any tax.
An understanding of the scope of section 212(3)2 requires an ex-
amination of several factors: judicial and administrative law de-
veloped prior to its enactment; the events which precipitated its
enactment; legislative conceptualization of its intended scope; judi-
cial and administrative construction of the statute since its enact-
ment; and the relationship of section 212(3) to other sections of
the Code.
Sidney Merians
Notwithstanding considerable case law since its enactment in
1954, the scope of section 212(3) remains an unsettled question.$
Sidney Merians,4 recently decided by the Tax Court where four con-
curring and two dissenting opinions were written, illustrates the
sharp division among the members of the court on the scope of sec-
tion 212(3). In that case, the taxpayers sought to deduct their en-
tire legal fee incurred for certain estate planning services, 5 argu-
ing that "the fee pertained solely to services and advice on tax
matters,"6 deductible under section 212(3). To a majority of the
court speaking through J. Simpson, the only issue in the case was
one of allocation based on their interpretation of the Commissioner's
concession;7 i.e., that any portion of the legal fee which can be
2. INT. REV. CODE op 1954, § 212 (3).
3. As recently as 1968, in the case of George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688, 700
(1968), the Tax Court stated: "Nor do we have a sufficient basis to justify
delving into the apparently unsettled question of the scope of section
212(3)." Compare Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964)
with Kaufmann v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
4. Sidney Merians, 60 T.C. 187 (1973), acq. 1973-42 Cum. BuLL. 6.
5. The legal services included the following: 1) the drafting of a
will; 2) the establishment of an irrevocable trust into which corporate
stock was transferred; 3) the dissolution of the corporation and the crea-
tion of a partnership with the trust as limited partner; 4) the establishment
of an irrevocable life insurance trust; and 5) the preparation of gift tax
returns with respect to the two irrevocable trusts.
6. Merians, 60 T.C. 187, 188.
7. In its brief, the government admitted that "...'there is a prob-
ability that some of the legal fee represented services which are deductible
under 212(3).'" Id. at 188. Query whether such admission was intended
to encompass the majority's broad view of section 212 (3). The legal serv-
ices provided the taxpayers included the preparation of two gift tax re-
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found to be attributable to tax advice, irrespective of its nature,
is deductible.$
The court considered the Commissioner's position in Meriars to
be the same as that adopted in Rev. Rul. 72-545.9 That ruling ad-
vised that any tax counsel expenses incurred in connection with a
divorce proceeding, including a property settlement, establishment
of a trust to fulfill marital support obligation, end the right to
claim children as dependents, is deductible. In support of its posi-
tion, the court cited Davis v. United States,10 decided by the Court
of Claims in 1961, which had pioneered the view that expenses in-
curred for tax planning11 are fully deductible under section 212(3)
and the regulations.12
In the first concurring opinion, two judges disagreed with the
government's interpretation of section 212(3) reflected in Rev.
Rul. 72-545, and would have given the taxpayer an opportunity
to prove that a portion of the fee was deductible under section
212(2). 13 In another opinion, three members of the court con-
curred in the result solely on the basis of the government's con-
cession, rejected the majority's broad interpretation of section 212
(3), and would have limited the deduction under that section to
turns, an expense squarely within the provisions of section 212(3). See
J. Scott's concurring opinion in Merians, 60 T.C. 187, 188.
8. Merians, 60 T.C. 187, 188.
9. Rev. Rul. 72-545, 1972-2 Cum. BuLL. 8.
10. 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961), affd in part and r'ev'd in part, 370 U.S.
65 (1961).
11. The concept of tax planning as used herein encompasses any effort
to reduce or otherwise affect tax burden prior to the completion of tax-
able transactions. See also 2 Institute For Business Planning, Inc., Tax
Planning 3401 (1972).
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(1) (1957).
13. Merians, 60 T.C. 187, 190 (Scott, Goffe, 33., concurring); In. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 212(2) provides that: "In the case of an individual, there
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year-(2) for the management, con-
servation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income.
." In his concurring opinion, J. Fay, citing Trust of Bingham v. Com-
missioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945) and Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 8 T.C. 130(1947), acq. 1947-1 Cum. BuLL. 1, agreed with J. Scott's suggestion re-
garding section 212(2) and went further to state: "In this day of high
taxes, when efforts are being made to encourage voluntary compliance with
our system of taxation, it seems ludicrous to contend that tax advice of
any type is not a proper management function of property held for the
production of income."
the expense of preparing gift tax returns.14
Three dissenting judges did not regard the government's con-
cession as binding on the court and also would have limited the de-
duction under section 212(3) to the expense of preparing gift tax
returns.15 Citing the House report,1 6 the dissent argued that the
plain meaning of section 212(3) precluded deductions for tax plan-
ning, as opposed to ". .. tax advice after the critical events have
occurred.' u7 In a separate opinion, a fourth dissenting judge con-
tended that legal expenses in connection with estate planning are
non-deductible "Personal expenditures which Congress never in-
tended should be allowed as a deduction for tax purposes"' 8 and
would have upheld the Commissioner's disallowance of the entire
fee.' 9
These individual views20 expressed in Merians are the first such
expressions on the scope of section 212(3)21 since Carpenter v.
United States22 was decided by the Court of Claims in 1964, allow-
ing the taxpayer to deduct under section 212(3) that portion of
legal fees which pertained solely to tax advice incident to an uncon-
tested divorce and separation.
NON-DEDUCTIBLE TAX-RELATED EXPENSES UNDER SECTION 23 (a) (2)
AND THE ORIGINAL REGULATIONS
After the Supreme Court decided Higgins v. Commissioner,23
14. Merians, 60 T.C. 187, 192 (Sterrett, Scott, Wiles, JJ., concurring).
15. Id. at 192 (Withey, Hoyt, Irwin, JJ., dissenting).
16. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, A59 (1954).
17. Merians, 60 T.C. 187, 197.
18. Id. at 198.
19. Id.
20. Note that JJ. Withey, Hoyt, and Irwin agreed with J. Quealy's dis-
sent disallowing the entire deduction, and yet in his own dissenting opinion,joined by JJ. Hoyt and Irwin, J. Witney would have allowed a deduction
for the expense of preparing the two gift tax returns.
21. Under the facts in Merians, three views were presented bearing on
the deductibility of tax planning expenses under section 212(3) in connec-
tion with estate planning: 1) tax advice irrespective of its nature is
deductible under section 212(3) (majority); 2) expenses for preparation
of gift tax returns only are deductible (Scott, Goffe, Sterrett, Wiles,
Withey, Hoyt, Irwin, J.J.); 3) expenses for estate planning are non-de-
ductible personal expenses (Quealy, J.). Thus, seven Tax Court members
under the facts in Merians would confine section 212(3) to include the
preparation of gift tax returns, rejecting the broad view taken by the ma-
jority, and one judge would allow no deduction under section 212(3).
But see De Castro, Recent Cases Show Liberal Trend in Allowing Deductions
For Legal Fees, 23 J. TAXATION 224 (1965); Gibbs, Developing Patterns in
the Deduction of Professional Fees, 50 TAxEs 771 (1972).
22. 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
23. 312 U.S. 212, 215 (1941), wherein the issue of what constituted a
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Congress responded by amending section 23(a) 24 of the 1939 Code
to provide for the deduction of all ordinary and necessary non-
trade or non-business expenses incurred for the production or
collection of income, or for the management, conservation, or main-
tenance of property held for the production of income.25 Shortly
thereafter, regulations promulgated under this new section pro-
hibited the deduction of expenses for preparing tax returns or re-
covering taxes, except where the tax was on property held for the
production of income, or the expense was clearly allocable to tax-
able recovery of interest or other property.2 By so qualifying
the deductibility of tax-related expenses, the regulation was thought
to be consistent with Congressional understanding that ordinary
and necessary expenses within the context of section 23(a) (2) im-
plied a reasonable amount bearing a reasonable and proximate
trade or business within the meaning of section 23 (a) of the Int. Rev. Act
of 1932, was resolved against the taxpayer based on the government's argu-
ment that ". . .'mere personal investment activities never constitute carry-
ing on a trade or business, no matter how much of one's time or of one's
employees' time they may occupy." See also Van Wart v. Commissioner,
295 U.S. 112, 115 (1935).
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23(a) allowing as a deduction "[a]ll the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business ......
25. § 121(a) of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 798, 814 (1942). In its
report to the House of Representatives, the Ways and Means Committee
stated in H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942) that:
The existing law allows taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred in
connection with a trade or business. Due partly to the inadequacy
of the statute and partly to court decisions, nontrade or nonbusi-
ness expenses are not deductible, although nontrade or nonbusi-
ness income is fully subject to tax. The bill corrects this inequity
by allowing all of the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or in-
curred for the production or collection of income. Thus, whether
or not the expense is in connection with the taxpayer's trade or
business, if it is expended in the pursuit of income or in connec-
tion with property held for the production of income it is deducti-
ble.
See also S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88 (1942).
26. Treas. Reg. § 29.23 (a) -15 (1942) in part providing:
Expenditures incurred for the purpose of preparing tax returns(except to the extent such returns relate to taxes on property held
for the production of income), for the purpose of recovering
taxes (other than recoveries required to be included in income) or
for the purpose of resisting a proposed additional assessment of
taxes (other than taxes on property held for the production of
income) are not deductible expenses under this section, except that
part thereof which the taxpayer clearly shows to be properly al-
locable to the recovery of interest required to be included in in-
come.
relation to the management of income-producing property.27
Pursuant to this regulation, lower courts upheld the Conmis-
sioner's interpretation of what constituted management, conserva-
tion, and maintenance under section 23(a) (2). Thus, deductions
were denied for expenses incurred for the preparation of state and
federal income tax returns,28 tax deficiency proposals and investi-
gations, 29 and tax litigation; 0 while deductions were allowed for
legal and accountant's fees in obtaining reduction of local tax assess-
ments,31 and expenses properly allocable to the recovery of tax-
able interest.3 2
Although the regulations made specific reference to deductible
"investment counsel,"3 3 there was no mention of deductible general
tax advice or tax planning, in the sense of expenses incurred be-
fore the completion of transactions having present or future tax
implications. Despite the regulations, the Tax Court early took
the position that such advice was a deductible expense if it was
proximately related to the management, conservation, or mainten-
ance of income-producing property,34 notwithstanding the fact that
27. See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942); S. REP. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1942); Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner,
325 U.S. 365 (1945); Brodsky and McKibbin, Deduction of Non-Trade or
Non-Business Expenses, 2 TAX L. REv. 39, 59 (1946-47).
28. Don A. Davis, 4 T.C. 329 (1944); Frank G. Logan, 3 T.C. 691(1944); Hord v. Commissioner, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec., par. 43,283 (1943),
aff'd, 143 F.2d 73, 76 (6th Cir. 1944) where the Circuit Court declared: 'It
would seem uncontrovertible that payments made to an accountant for
assistance in the preparation of income tax returns would not be included
as deductible expense within the category of the pertinent statute;" Higgins
v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 948, affd, 143 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1943); R.C.
Coffey, 1 T.C. 579 (1943) (denial based on insufficient evidence).
29. Joseph Hexter, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec., par. 44,399 (1943); Cynthia
K. Herbst, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec., par. 43,309 (1943); John C. Wilmott, 2
T.C. 321 (1943).
30. Commissioner v. Kenan, 145 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1944); Stoddard v.
Commissioner, 141 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1944) where the court in referring
to the scope of section 23 (a) (2), remarked:
To extend this language to make it possible for taxpayers to de-duct.., the expense of litigation over the amount of their income
taxes would be too great a stretch in the absence of anything toindicate that Congress intended to so encourage such litigation....
Frank G. Hogan, 3 T.C. 691 (1944); Charles N. Manning, 3 T.C. 853 (1944);
Samuel Thorne, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec., par. 44,323 (1944); James C. McFad-
din, 2 T.C. 395, 411 (1943), rev'd in part on other grounds, 148 F.2d 570(5th Cir. 1945).
31. R.C. Coffey, 1 T.C. 579 (1943).
32. Samuel Thorne, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec., par. 44,323 (1944); Percival E.
Foerderer, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec., par. 43,102 (1943), aff'd on other grounds,
141 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1944); Cynthia K. Herbst, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec., par.
43,309 (1943); James C. McFaddin, 2 T.C. 395 (1943).
33. Treas. Reg. § 39.23 (a) -15 (g) (1942).
34. Don A. Davis, 4 T.C. 329 (1944) (dictum).
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minimizing one's taxes neither affects the actual yield of invest-
ment capital nor its appreciation 35 As an example, in Andrew
Jergens,36 the taxpayer hired an investment firm to advise him on
the handling of certain German securities and the adoption of a
proposed merger plan, the object of which was to preserve his
control of the business and minimize his tax liability. The Tax
Court had no trouble in concluding that "[i] t is obvious that he is
conserving and maintaining his property."3"
However, as to general tax advice not proximately related to in-
come-producing property, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in
affirming a Tax Court decision, declared such expenses to be non-
deductible personal expenses "clearly" outside the scope of sec-
tion 23 (a) (2) and the regulations.38
NEw DIP cTio: Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner
Despite the weight accorded regulations consistently upheld by
judicial interpretation,39 the Supreme Court struck down the regu-
lations under 23(a) (2) in Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner.40
35. In Commissioner v. Kenan, 145 F.2d 568, 570 (2d Cir. 1944), the
Second Circuit Court denied a deduction for legal fees incurred by trustees
in contesting a tax deficiency based on this rationale; i.e., expenses are
non-deductible ". . . when incurred merely to prevent the incidence of taxes
which neither affected the yield of investment capital nor its appreciation."
On the other hand, in Cammack v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 476, 470 (1945), the
Tax Court gave recognition to an "economic benefit" test to determine
whether an expense constituted "management." In that case, the tax-
payer had unsuccessfully attempted to deduct the bases of worthless stock
and subsequently incurred legal fees contesting the disallowance of that
deduction. In declaring the taxpayers effort to deduct the worthless stock
an act of management, the court states: "The economic benefit resulting
from that deduction was the natural-in fact the only-means reasonably
left to them of obtaining any such benefit." See also William v. McGowan,
152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945).
36. P-H T.C. Memo. Dec., par. 43,322 (1943).
37. Id. at 1014.
38. 2 T.C. 948, aff'd, 143 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1944).
39. See 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcmE TAXATIoN, § 3.20 (rev.
ed. 1966) and the cases cited therein.
40. 325 U.S. 365 (1945). That portion of Treas. Reg. § 29.23(a)-15 in-
validated by the Court provided that:
Expenditures incurred . . . for the purpose of recovering taxes(other than recoveries required to be included in income) or for
the purpose of resisting a proposed additional assessment of taxes(other than taxes on property held for the production of income)
are not deductible expenses under this section, except that part
Relying on the rationale of its earlier decisions under section 23
(a) (1),41 and upon the legislative history of section 23(a) (2),42
the Court held that expenses under the latter section need not re-
sult in the production of income, so long as they are directly con-
nected with or proximately result from the management, conser-
vation, or maintenance of property held for the production of in-
come. By rejecting the approach taken by the regulations that
deductible expenses under 23(a) (2) must result in the produc-
tion of income, the decision gave substance to the class of expen-
ditures deductible under section 23(a) (2) which, with few ex-
ceptions, had been effectively regulated out of existence since its en-
actment in 1942. Specifically included among deductible expenses
to the taxpayer trust in Bingham were legal fees for unsuccessfully
contesting an income tax deficiency, as well as legal advice in con-
nection with " . . . tax and other problems arising upon the ex-
piration of the trust."43
The taxpayer in Bingham was a trust whose expenses quite prop-
erly related to trust property. Nevertheless, following the decision
in Bingham, lower courts had little difficulty in finding the re-
quisite proximate relationship with "management, conservation,
or maintenance" to sustain deductions for the cost of preparing in-
come tax returns,44 and contesting income tax deficiencies. 45  In
thereof which the taxpayer clearly shows to be properly allocable to
the recovery of interest required to be included in income.Compare Higgins v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 948, affd, 143 F.2d 654, 656 (1st
Cir. 1943), where the court declared:
We believe that the regulations are in complete harmony with thepurpose of the statute and that the Commissioner did not exceed
his authority in issuing them. The language of the regulations im-
plement the statute and the meaning of the regulations is not
strained or artificial.
41. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1943); Kornhauser
v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928), decided under section 214(a) (1) of
the Revenue Act of 1918, wherein the Court first promulgated the so-called
"direct connection" test in allowing the taxpayer (an attorney) to deduct
legal expenses incurred in successfully defending an accounting suit brought
by his former law partner respecting shares of stock allegedly received for
services before the termination of the partnership. See generally McDon-
ald, Deduction of Attorney's Fees For Federal Income Tax Purposes, 103 U.
PENN. L. REV. 168 (1954); Note, Income Tax Deductions For Estate Planning
Fees, 23 VAND. L. REV. 104 (1969).
42. Supra note 25.
43. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 368 (1945).
44. David L. Loew, 7 T.C. 363 (1946); Charles Crowther, 28 T.C. 1293(1957).
45. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945); Stoddard v.
Commissioner, 152 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1945), overruling the court's earlier
decision against the taxpayer, 141 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); Pelham v. Wode-
house, 8 T.C. 637 (1946), rev'd on other grounds, 166 F.2d 986 (4th Cir.
1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 369 (1949); M.J. Donnelly, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec.,
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fact, the Tax Court held that expenses incurred in contesting an
income tax deficiency were deductible whether or not the income
out of which the dispute arose was derived from property held for
the production of income.46
From the standpoint of tax planning, two Tax Court decisions
during this post-Bingham period were significant insofar as they
represented an application of the "economic benefit" test 47 enun-
ciated earlier by the Tax Court: 1) William Heyman48 upheld the
deduction of accountant's fees for conferences with representatives
of the IRS who were examining the taxpayer's returns from prior
years, although the dissent argued that such an expense failed to
meet the proximate connection criteria set forth in Bingham; 2) In
Philip Armour,49 the taxpayer procured legal advice solely to as-
certain the tax implications of the following matters: corporate
dividends, annuities, the holding period of securities, and a partial
loss deduction. Although the court's stated rational in Armour for
allowing this tax advice to be deducted was its "bearing" upon the
management of his income-producing property, implicit in the deci-
sion was the court's recognition of the potential economic benefit
of such tax-related advice to the taxpayer. Certainly, such advice
did not affect the yield of his capital investment nor its apprecia-
tion,50 yet the determination of tax liability was an act of manage-
ment to the extent that it contributed to reducing the tax cost of
holding property for the production of income.
As illustrated by the Tax Court's rationale in these two decisions,
the unique characteristic of deductible tax planning advice is that
the deduction effectively encourages efforts to devise sophisti-
cated tax strategies, the purpose of which is to reduce tax reven-
ues."'
par. 48,244 (1948); James A. Connelly, 6 T.C. 744 (1946); Marshall v. Com-
missioner, 5 T.C. 1032 (1945); Cammack v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 467 (1945);
Commissioner v. Goldberger's Estate, 213 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1954). But see
Edmunds v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Mo. 1947) where the court
denied an heir a deduction for expenses incurred in seeking a refund of
federal estate taxes on the decedent's state.
46. Marshall v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1032 (1945).
47. Note 35 supra.
48. 6 T.C. 799 (1946).
49. 6 T.C. 359 (1946).
50. Note 35 supra.
51. For this reason, tax counsel have often come under attack, illus-
THE 1946 AMENDED REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION 23 (a) (2)
To reflect the Supreme Court's construction of section 23(a) (2)
in Bingham, the regulations were amended in May, 1946, to provide
in part, that "l[ e] xpenses paid or incurred by an individual in the
determination of liability for taxes upon his income are deduct-
ible."5 2  Not only did the amended regulation reflect Bingham,
but it went beyond Bingham by omitting the requirement that
such tax determination expenses relate to taxes on income realized
from property held for the production of income.58 To what extent
this amendment was intended to include expenses for tax plan-
ning not proximately related to income-producing property is not
clear.
Arguably, the term "determination of liability" suggests tax
advice after the fact; that is, after the taxpayer has done every-
thing he can to be entitled to the actual or constructive receipt of
income, and after the timing of expenditures has been fixed. Al-
though the term "determination" generally connotes an ending or
trated by the following comments of Senator Douglas of Illinois:
We all know our present tax system has so many loopholes or 'truck
holes' that certain favored groups are able to escape taxation on
large parts of their income. These exemptions are steadily
widened by legislation and perhaps even more by the rise of two
well-paid new professions, namely tax lawyers and tax account-
ants. These gentlemen help citizens avoid and in some cases, to
evade the payment of taxes which in all good conscience they
should pay. A bewildering variety of tax gimmicks and argu-
ments are developed with which the revenue officials and courts are
either unable or unwilling to cope,
in Groh, Responsibilities in Tax Practice, 42 TAXEs 165, 166 (1964). Con-
tra, J. Durfee's majority opinion in Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d
366 (Ct. Cl. 1964), and Brown, Responsibilities of a Taxpayer, 20 U. So.
CAL. 1963 TAX INST. 1, 21-22, wherein the author suggests that tax counsel
assist in the revenue raising function as well as to help avoid tax contests.
52. Treas. Reg. § 29.23 (a) -15 (1946), T.D. 5513, 1946-11 CuM. BuLL. 3,
providing:
Expenses paid or incurred by an individual in the determination
of liability for taxes upon his income are deductible. If property is
held by an individual for the production of income, amounts ex-
pended in determining a property tax imposed with respect to
such property during the period when so held are deductible. Ex-
penses paid or incurred by an individual in determining or con-
testing any liability asserted against him do not become deductible,
however, by reason of the fact that property held by him for the
production of income may be required to be used or sold for the
purpose of satisfying such liability. Thus, expenses paid or in-
curred by an individual in the determination of gift tax liability,
except to the extent that such expenses are allocable to interest on
a refund of gift taxes, are not deductible even though property held
by him for the production of income must be sold to satisfy an
assessment for such tax liability or even though, in the event of a
claim for refund, the amount received will be held by him for the
production of income.
53. See Brodsky and McKibbin, Deduction of Non-Trade or Non-Business
Expenses, 2 TAx L. REv. 39, 58-60 (1946-47).
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finality, it has been defined as an estimate; similarly, "liability" is
a broad legal term which has been referred to as an obligation or
responsibility which is absolute, contingent, or even likely.54 If
"determination of liability" is viewed as an estimate of likely tax
upon projected income, less probable expenditures, the regulation
would seem to encompass tax planning in general including the
timing of expenses, controlling the characterization of income, and
income deferral.55 Less than two years earlier, the First Circuit
had rejected such an interpretation of section 23(a) (2) as being
clearly not within the provisions of the statute.56 Thus, while
Bingham invalidated the original regulations as being too restric-
tive a construction of that section, it is arguable that the amended
regulation was outside the statute's intended scope and, therefore,
likewise invalid.57
THE ImPETUS FOR SEcTIOx 212 (3)
The amended regulations explicitly denied a deduction for ex-
penses connected with gift tax liability, except that portion allo-
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 536, 1059 (4th ed. 1951); although dic-
tionary meanings of statutory terms may sometimes be misleading, they do
serve the useful function of limiting the range of possible meanings; see
Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1962); 1 J. MERTENs, LAW
or FEDEIAL INCONME TAXATION, § 3.14 (rev. ed. 1966).
55. A maxim or rule of thumb often repeated in construing statutory
language is that a word is known by the company it keeps. Interestingly,
in the cited portion of the amendment, note 52 above, containing four
sentences, the term "determination" is used in two of the four sentences,
"determining" in the other two, while "liability" is used in all four. It is
not clear from the phrases "determination of liability for taxes" and
"determination of gift tax liability" found in the first and fourth sen-
tences respectively, whether the term "determination" encompasses tax
planning. However, two other phrases within the cited portion of the
amendment, "determining a property tax imposed" and "determining or
contesting any liability asserted against," remove, so it could be argued, the
term "determination" from the context of an estimate or projection, to
that of an evaluation or assessment of the tax implications of given facts
or events, though not necessarily mere arithmetical computation. Simi-
larly, the context of other phrases within this regulatory passage, "any lia-
bility asserted against," "for the purpose of satisfying such tax liability,"
"to satisfy an assessment for such tax liability," connote a matured obliga-
tion in the sense that its value does not depend on contingent income or
likely expenditures. See also 1 J. MErrEs, LAw or FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, § 3.16 (rev. ed. 1966) and the cases cited therein.
56. Higgins v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 948, affd, 143 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1943).
57. This argument is suggested by Brodsky and McKibbin, supra note
53, at 60.
cable to interest on a gift tax refund,58 and in so doing, were
thought consistent with Bin gham and the thrust of section 23(a)
(2) as originally conceived by Congress. 59 Logically, by reducing
the donor's resources, a gift is the antithesis of the production of
collection of income, even though such a gift of income-producing
assets could reduce taxable income to the taxpayer donor, and thus
fulfill the economic benefit test. However, at this point, the prop-
erty is no longer being held for the production of income to or for
the donor, within the meaning of section 23(a) (2).( °  Thus, the
Tax Court's decision in Frank M. Cobb6 ' disallowing the deducti-
bility of litigation expenses incurred with respect to gift tax lia-
bility, and the Supreme Court's decision in Lykes v. United
States2 sustaining Cobb's interpretation of section 23(a) (2), were
consistent with the amended regulations.
Arguably, the direct impetus for the enactment of section 212(3)
in 1954 was the concluding portion of J. Jackson's strong dissenting
opinion in Lykes where he stated:
The Treasury may feel that it is good public policy to discourage
taxpayers from contesting its unjustified demands for taxes and
thus justify penalizing resistance. It is hard to imagine any in-
stance in which the Treasury could have a stronger self-interest
in its regulation .... I think Congress allows a taxpayer to pro-
tect his estate, even against the Treasury.- It seems to me a tacit
slander of the Nation's credit that need for money should drive
us to such casuistry as this.63
Without citing any authority in his Lykes dissent, Jackson rejected
the Court's theory of what constituted conservation of property
within the meaning of section 23 (a) (2) ;64 i.e., legal expenses do not
become deductible under that section merely because they shield
58. Treas. Reg. § 29.23(a)-15 (1946), T.D. 5513, 1946-11 Cum. BULL. 3.
59. See Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952) (dictum).
60. See Hunter v. United States, 219 F.2d 69, 70 (1955) where the court
declared that "production" of income means the creation of increased
gross income, not a reduction of liability or an increase of net taxable
income by a reduction of allowable deductions in computing net income;
Edmunds v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Mo. 1947); Thomas A.
Grabien, 48 T.C. 750 (1967); Bertie Charles Forbes, 18 T.C. 321 (1952); Aldo
R. Balsam Trust, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec., par. 44,368 (1944); Rentschler v.
Commissioner, 1 T.C. 814 (1943). But cf. Hobert J. Hendrick, 35 T.C. 1223
(1961).
61. 10 T.C. 380 (1949), aff'd, 173 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1949).
62. 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
63. Id. at 128-29 (emphasis added).
64. The regulations have never attempted to define the terms "manage-
ment, conservation, or maintenance." Compare Helvering v. Stormfeltz,
142 F.2d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 1944), rehearing denied, where the court rea-
soned that such terms imported the "... . idea of utilization and preserva-
tion of specific property owned and used by the taxpayer."
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or conserve the taxpayer's income-producing assets from liability.
A sense of fairness to the taxpayer, especially in fact situations
such as in Lykes where the Commissioner's over-assessment was
arguably unreasonable,6 5 motivated Jackson to reject the Trea-
sury's position principally on public policy grounds.
THE SEACH FOR LEGisLATIV INTENT
Congress responded in 1954 with the enactment of section 212(3)
allowing a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses incurred
in connection with the "determination, collection, or refund of any
tax."66 Given the 1946 regulations under section 23 (a) (2) and the
decisions in Lykes and Cobb, it is undisputed that section 212 (3)
was intended to overturn established law with respect to gift tax
liability expenses.67 Unfortunately, the question which is not an-
swered by the chosen language of that section is the extent to which
Congress intended to reach beyond the specific holdings in these de-
cisions as to other tax-related expenses.
It is a fundamental proposition that legislative history of a sta-
tute, including committee reports, is extremely inportant and can
be of assistance in interpreting the meaning of statutory language.6 8
The often-cited House and Senate committee reports69 on section
65. The facts revealed that Lykes initially paid a gift tax in 1940 total-
ling $13,032.75, but the Commissioner assessed a gift tax deficiency of
$145,276.50. Lykes subsequently paid $15,612.75 in settlement of the defi-
ciency pursuant to a finding of the Tax Court.
66. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212(3).
67. See Commissioner v. Shapiro, 278 F.2d 556, n.3 (7th Cir. 1960); Gibbs,
Post-Gilmore: Recent Trends in the Deductibility of Professional Fees, 23
Sw. L.J. 644, 655-61 (1969); Scott, Deductions for Cost of Tax Advice are
Often Subject to IRS Attack, 22 J. TAXATION 174 (1965).
68. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534 (1940);
White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281 (1938); Herbert J. Kent, 35 T.C. 18
(1960). See generally 1 3. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATON,
§ 3.26, 3.29 (rev. ed. 1966) and the cases collected therein.
69. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, A59 (1954); S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 218 (1954). The Ways and Means Committee re-
port reads as follows:
Existing law allows an individual to deduct expenses connected
with earning income or managing and maintaining income-pro-
ducing property. Under the regulations costs incurred in connec-
tion with contests over certain tax liabilities, such as income and
estate taxes have been allowed, but these costs have been disallowed
where the contest involved gift-tax liability. A new provision added
by your committee allows a deduction for expenses connected
212(3), however, do not unequivocally set forth the legislative in-
tent in enacting that section of the Code. The House Ways and
Means Committee report,70 after restating sections 212(1)71 and
212(2)72 in capsule form, focuses primarily on tax liability contests,
explicitly noting the heretofore non-deductibility of gift tax con-
test expenses. By so focusing on "contests," the report is logically
subject to the interpretation that section 212(3) was intended to be
restricted to expenses in connection with a contested tax liability.
The American Bar Association Section of Taxation, particularly,
acknowledged such an interpretation, but its suggestion that "com-
putation" be added before "determination" was not implemented.73
By contrasting the terminology of this committee report with
that of the 1946 regulations under section 23 (a) (2),7-1 one can theor-
ize as to what significance, if any, the committee intended to attach
to the term "contest." With respect to gift tax, the 1946 regulations
make reference to "determination of gift tax liability," and "claim
for refund," but not contest or collection. The committee report,
on the other hand, makes reference to the 1946 regulations in
terms of gift-tax "contests," stating that "[u]nder the regulations
... costs have been disallowed where the contest involved gift
tax liability."7 5
with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax liability.
Paragraph (3) is new and is designed to permit the deduction
by an individual of legal and other expenses paid or incurred in
connection with a contested tax liability, whether the contest be
Federal, state, or municipal taxes, or whether the tax be income,
estate, gift, property, and so forth. Any expenses incurred in con-
testing any liability collected as a tax or as part of the tax will
be deductible.
70. Supra note 69.
71. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 212(1) providing: "In the case of an in-
dividual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-(l) for the
production or collection of income; .. "
72. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212(2).
73. See Hearings on H.R. 8300 before the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 487 (1954):
The language of the committee report appears to confine expenses
in connection with tax matters to contested tax liabilities under
paragraph (3) of section 212. Since a specific provision ordinarily
controls a general provision, this might have the effect of limiting
deductions with respect to all taxes, including even income taxes,
to contested matters. It is believed that this result was not in-
tended. This problem might be eliminated by adding the word
'computation' before 'determination' in section 212(3). In any
event, the Senate Finance Committee report should clarify the point
that deductions with respect to taxes are hereafter to be confined to
contested taxes.
See also Blades, Deductibility of the Legal Expenses of Divorce, 14 KANSAS
L. REv. 85 (1965).
74. Treas. Reg. § 29.23 (a) -15 (1946), T.D. 5513, 1946-11 Cum. BuLL. 3.
75. Supra note 69.
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If one assumes there is a correlation between the language of
the 1946 regulations and the terminology chosen by the committee
in its report on section 212(3), it can be argued that the report's
use of the term "contest" corresponds not only to a "claim for re-
fund," but also to a "determination of gift tax liability," as those
phrases were used in the 1946 regulations. Viewed in this light, the
emphasis placed on the word "contest" in the report was not in-
tended to narrow the scope of section 212(3) exclusively to con-
tested tax liabilities, but rather, merely to remove any doubt as to
the deductibility of litigation expenses with respect to "any liability
collected as a tax."76
Against this theory of the committee report and legislative in-
tent must be placed the statutory language of section 212(3). If
one compares the phraseology used in the report with that of sec-
tion 212(3), they are seemingly consistent with each other. How-
ever, whereas the report reads "connected with the determina-
tion, collection, or refund of any tax liability,"7 7 the statute omits
the term "liability." If one assumes that the phrase "determina-
tion of tax liability" connotes an evaluation of a matured obliga-
tion, the question arises whether the removal of "liability"
strengthens the argument that "determination," within the mean-
ing of section 212(3), was intended to encompass tax planning in
general. The 1946 regulations, with the exception of the phrase
"determining a property tax imposed," only made reference to the
determination of liability, not the determination of any tax. Argu-
ably, unless the term "tax liability" is redundant, the determina-
tion of a tax rather than of a liability is a broader concept, since 'a
tax is defined in a general sense as a contribution to government,
and not as a debt or matured pecuniary obligation (tax liability).
Or, perhaps this line of reasoning is merely an exercise in seman-
tics. The omission of the term "liability" could have been simply
to accommodate the inclusion of both "determination" and "refund"
in the same statutory provision, since refund of any tax is concep-
tually more precise than refund of any tax liability. The final regu-
lations78 issued under section 212(3) lend support to this accommo-
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1 (1) (1957), providing:
Expenses paid or incurred by an individual in connection with the
determination, collection, or refund of any tax, whether the taxing
dation theory, since the terms "determining" and "liability" are
used solely in the context of tax proceedings, not in the sense of
estimating a likely tax on anticipated income or with respect to fu-
ture tax-related transactions.
No doubt, the language of the 1946 regulations, the committee re-
port, and section 212(3) is sufficiently correlated to provide a basis
upon which to hypothesize as to Congressional intent on the scope
of section 212(3). Yet, it is problematical to definitively state what
that scope was intended to be based solely on the committee
report.7 9 If in choosing the term "determination," Congress in-
tended to convey a meaning similar to that which it arguably had
within the 1946 regulations under section 23(a) (2),80 then the
addition of section 212(3) would only serve to overturn the Lykes
holding. If, on the other hand, the omission of "liability" was in-
tended to work a substantive change in the law by enlarging the
category of deductible tax-related expenses, then the concept of
determining any tax under section 212(3) is, indeed, significantly
broad.
JuDIcIAL CONSTRUCTION: Bonnyman, Davis, Carpenter
The first case to consider the scope of section 212(3) was Bon-
nyman v. United States,81 in which the donee of stock sought to de-
duct legal expenses incurred in contesting and settling a gift tax de-
ficiency asserted against the donor. Given the donee's statutory
liability for the deficiency,8 2 the court found a sufficient interest in
the assessment to justify a deduction under section 212(3), and at
the same time, rejected the taxpayer's argument that such expenses
were also deductible under section 212(2). 83 Citing the proposed
authority be Federal, State, or municipal, and whether the tax beincome, estate, gift, property, or any other tax, are deductible.
Thus, expenses paid or incurred by a taxpayer for tax counsel or
expenses paid or incurred in connection with the preparation of
his tax returns or in connection with any proceedings involved indetermining the extent of tax liability or in contesting his taxliability are deductible.(emphasis added).
79. In this regard, consider Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369, 383, n.58(S.D. Cal. 1952) where the court observes: "Regardless of legislative in-
tent, the legislator speaks to the court through the terminology which he
adopts in the final legislation. At times it may be contrary to the expressed
intent because the words chosen do not express such intent."
80. Supra note 55.
81. 156 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Tenn. 1957), affd, 261 F.2d 835 (6th Cir. 1958).
82. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 1012; now IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6324 (b).
83. In Northern Trust Co. v. Campbell, 211 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1954), the
taxpayer had sought to deduct legal fees incurred in defending a claim for
federal estate taxes asserted against him as transferee of a testamentary
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regulations under section 212(3)84 and the language of the Senate
Finance Committee report,8 5 the court observed: "The language
of sub-section 3 is broad. It gives the taxpayer the right to deduct
for income tax purposes all ordinary and necessary expenses in
the contest of any tax whether state or federal."8 6 This observa-
tion, together with other dicta in the opinion suggesting Lykes and
Cobb "may have" prompted Congress to enact section 212 (3), essen-
tially paraphrase the committee's report, without providing new
insight into the intended scope of section 212(3).
It was not until the Court of Claims decided Davis v. United
States,8 7 that the deductibility of tax-related expenses under sec-
tion 212(3), other than tax return preparation and litigation costs,
was squarely presented. In Davis, the taxpayer husband argued
that legal fees paid to both his and his wife's attorney for tax
advice incident to negotiation and execution of a separation and
property settlement agreement were deductible under section 212
(3). Specifically, he cited a portion of the final regulations under
section 212(3) providing that fees paid as services for "tax coun-
sel or expenses paid or incurred in connection with the prepara-
tion of ... tax returns ... are deductible."88
Preferring not to cite the legislative history,89 or other relevant
authority,90 the court relied solely on the regulations91 to reach its
trust. The court sustained the deduction under section 23(a) (2) as
being in proximate relation to the conservation of property held for the
production of income; accord, Goldberg v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 258 (1958).
84. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1 (1), 22 Fed. Reg. 10052 (1957).
85. Supra note 69.
86. Bonnyman v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 625, 628 (E.D. Tenn. 1957),
alf'd, 261 F.2d 835 (6th Cir. 1958); accord, Carlos Marcello, 23 CCR Tax Ct.
Mem. 1847 (1964).
87. 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(1) (1957).
89. Ironically, A.P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383, 386
(Ct. Cl. 1960), decided by the Court of Claims four months prior to its
decision in Davis, contains the following dicta: "Bold definitional lines can-
not be drawn with the meager legislative history available. We do not feel,
however, that the effect of the statute should be severely restricted to the
illustration used in the committee report since it in no way appears that
the example was used for that purpose. An explanatory tale should not
wag a statutory dog" (emphasis added).
90. Arguably, Higgins v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 948, aff'd, 143 F.2d 654
(1st Cir. 1943).
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(1) (1957).
conclusion. However, the language of the regulations cited by the
court was not that quoted by the taxpayer, but rather, that portion
allowing a deduction for "tax counsel .. in connection with any
proceedings involved in determining the extent of tav liability
... are deductible.1"9 2 Based on this language, the court was able
to make two conclusory statements: 1) "[I] t seems clear that the
statute and the regulations are broad enough to cover the deduc-
tion asked for; '93 2) "[I]t seems obvious that the fees paid by
plaintiff for consultation and advice in tax matters arising in con-
nection with the settlement agreement are deductible .... 94
With respect to both statements, even assuming arguendo that
negotiations between two attorneys over a property settlement con-
stitute "proceedings" as that term is generally understood, it is not
clear that the negotiations themselves were involved in deter-
mining the extent of "tax liability," the administrative contextual
history of which phrase already has been considered. A fair reading
of the regulation suggests that the proceedings must have as their
principal purpose the resolution of tax liability, rather than pro-
ceedings or negotiations such as in Davis where the tax conse-
quences are collateral to the primary issue in dispute; i.e., divorce
or separation.
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari,95 the govern-
ment chose not to appeal the deductibility of the fees paid to the
husband's attorney, and the Court intimated no decision on that
particular issue. But as to the fee paid to the wife's attorney, the
Court sustained the denial of a deduction, interpreting section 212
(3) in effect to read "[i]n connection with the determination...
of any tax of the taxpayer." As to whether tax planning expenses
such as those in Davis are properly within the scope of section 212
(3), the Court deferred judgment, only to say that, "[w] e read the
statute, if applicable to this type of tax expense, to include only
the expenses of the taxpayer himself .... -96
The facts in Davis revealed that income and gift tax "consequen-
ces" of the various proposals were considered in the negotiations,
the expenses of which, said the Court of Claims, are properly de-
ductible under section 212(3). Thus, the question which Davis im-
plicitly answered in the negative is whether a valid distinction can
92. Id.
93. Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168, 170 (Ct. CL 1961) (emphasis
added).
94. Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
95. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 74 (1961).
96. Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
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be drawn under section 212(3) between prospective tax planning on
the one hand, and analyzing the tax implications of completed trans-
actions on the other.
The Court of Claims did not consider the question to be as clear
and as obvious when it decided Carpenter v. United States.97 On
facts substantially similar to those in Davis, the taxpayer in Car-
penter contended that the portion of his legal fee properly allo-
cable to advice as to the tax consequences of his uncontensted di-
vorce and separation was deductible under section 212(3). Since
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Gilmore9" had
foreclosed the possibility of deducting legal fees incident to a di-
vorce or separation under section 212(2), the taxpayer relied ex-
clusively on section 212(3).
Citing the committee reports, the government argued that de-
ductibility of tax counsel is limited to proceedings involving tax
controversies and, therefore, Davis was wrongly decided and should
now be overruled. The court disposed of this argument simply by
restating the language of section 212(3) which, on its face, is not
limited to tax contests. But the court was not willing to rest its
decision on a cursory rebuttal of the government's theory, nor on
the "tax counsel" language contained in the regulations, which the
Carpenter court considered "sufficiently clear by itself to allow
the deduction sought here."99 Rather, the court reasoned that since
there was no indication in the regulations that its enumeration of
tax-related deductible expenses was meant to be exclusive, a tax-
payer should not be restricted to a deduction of expenses for "...
tax counsel solely to discover the tax consequences of what has al-
ready transpired or a tax liability already accrued."' 00  Thus, the
question which Davis implicitly answered in the negative-that is,
whether a statutory basis exists to distinguish what has been de-
97. 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. C1. 1964).
98. 372 U.S. 39 (1963) and companion case, United States v. Patrick,
372 U.S. 53 (1963); in Gilmore, the Court established the principle that the
"... origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense
was incurred, rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the
taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of whether the expense was 'busi-
ness' or 'personal' and hence whether it is deductible or not under section
23 (a) (2)." Id. at 49. Accord, Meyer J. Fleischman, 45 T.C. 439 (1965).
But cf. Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
99. Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366, 368 (Ct. C1. 1964).
100. Id. at 369.
fined as tax planning on the one hand, and analyzing completed
transactions on the other-was explicitly done so in Carpenter.
The Carpenter court's analysis of section 212 (3) and the regula-
tions is subject to challenge. The court analogizes tax counsel to
investment counsel to support its conclusion that tax planning ex-
penses are deductible under section 212(3). The rationale for al-
lowing investment counsel expenses to be deductible under section
212 (2) is that such expenses theoretically increase the yield and
appreciation of assets. Arguably, this rationale is inapposite to sec-
tion 212(3) in determining the deductibility of tax-related expenses
for the reason that section 212(3) " . . . merely represents a policy
judgment as to a particular class of expenditures otherwise
non-deductible .... -101 Neither the legislative history of section
212(3) nor the statutory language itself substantiates the thrust of
the court's preference from a public policy standpoint that tax-
payers should be allowed to freely deduct tax planning expenses.
Secondly, the court's discussion of the terms "determination" and
"tax counsel" only in the context of preparing income tax returns,
does not square with its pro-taxpayer conclusion that tax planning
expenses are properly deductible under section 212(3). As set forth
in the concluding portion of its decision, the court would define
determination as the computation and payment of one's tax, ini-
tially, by the taxpayer himself, who is then entitled to consult the
IRS for advice and/or employ tax counsel to assist him in arriving
at this "determination." This conceptualization of the term "deter-
mination" is broader than a tax contest, yet by the court's re-
strictive definition, would seemingly exclude tax counsel expenses
of planning transactions so as to minimize the consequent tax lia-
bility.
The fact that it was a legitimate purpose of the taxpayer in Car-
penter to employ counsel to minimize both his present and future
tax burden through deductible periodic alimony payments is not
disputed. 02 This assertion, however, begs the question whether such
tax planning expenses are properly within the statutory concept of
"determination," even as that term is used by the court in its de-
cision. The taxpayer in Carpenter did not seek tax counsel to assist
101. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 n.16 (1963). Contra, Note,
Income Taxes: Deductibility of Legal Fees Under 212(3), 19 MIAM L. REV.
506, 509 (1965).
102. It has been frequently stated that a taxpayer has the legal right to
minimize his tax burden or avoid it altogether by means which the law
permits. See United States v. Isham, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 496 (1874); Greg-
ory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Jones v. Grinnell, 179 F.2d 873 (10th
Cir. 1950); Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
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him in preparing his tax return as the court suggests, nor to as-
sist him in the process of self-assessment of tax liability, including
the computation and payment of his current tax.10 3
In his dissenting opinion in Carpenter, J. Davis makes a strong
argument for the proposition that by extending the deduction for
tax counsel back to include the period when transactions are in the
planning process or ".... when taxable events are still uncertain
and in future,"'1 4 Davis and Carpenter broadened the scope of
section 212(3) beyond the original legislative understanding. While
J. Davis rejected the majority's approach to section 212(3), he did
not accept the government's position either, which would limit the
scope of that section proceedings involving tax controversies. In-
stead, he preferred his own analysis of the statutory language:
The words of the Code ('determination, collection or refund of
any tax') connote an appraisal of tax liability on the basis of past
or settled events, not a molding of future events to minimize taxes.
Each of the three words deals with a function related to taxes
already due or about to become due, not with planning ahead.
The legislative history treats exclusively with a still more re-
stricted problem, a tax contest; and even the Bar Association's
proposal to add 'computation' would not, on a normal readying,
carry back further than to activities in preparation for a re-
turn. 0 5
J. Davis' interpretation struck a compromise between what, argu-
ably, was a narrow reading of section 212 (3) by the government
and the far-reaching position adopted by the majority.
Having lost both in Davis and Carpenter, one can speculate whe-
ther the government should have presented this precise issue to the
Supreme Court for review, especially in light of Gilmore, decided
103. Davis and Carpenter have been distinguished on the basis that
Davis involved the deductibility of tax advice pertaining to the taxpayer's
potential liability for the current year, whereas Carpenter involved the de-
ductibility of advice pertaining not only to his tax liability in the year in
which the divorce and separation were concluded, but also for the tax conse-
quences of future support payments pursuant to the divorce decree. Argu-
ably, this factor is a distinction without a difference since in both cases, the
tax advice was sought before the taxable event occurred. Contra, Gibbs,
supra note 67; Recent Cases, Federal Income Tax-Section 212(3) Extended
to Attorney's Fees Arising Out of Divorce Settlement, 18 VANw. L. REV. 1611
(1965).
104. Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366, 371 (Ct. C1. 1964) (dissent-
ing opinion).
105. Id. at 371-72.
by the Court nearly two years before Carpenter, which had prom-
ulgated the "origin and character of the claim" test under section
212(2), ending any conjecture that section 212(2) was to become a
catch-all for litigation expenses in connection with divorce and sep-
aration. Nevertheless, Carpenter represented the last case where
the government contested in principle the deductibility of tax plan-
nining advice incident to a divorce, separation, or property settle-
ment.1 6 However, the burden remains on the taxpayer to estab-
lish that his allocation of the fee to tax advice is reasonable and
capable of being sustantiated 0 7
REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION 212 (3)
As noted earlier there was dicta in Carpenter for the proposition
that the term "tax counsel" in the regulations was "sufficiently
clear" in itself to sustain the deductibility of tax planning expenses.
Originally, the proposed regulations under section 212(3) did not
contain this tax counsel clause, but when the final regulations were
issued, such language had been specifically inserted at the begin-
ning of the second sentence. To a majority of the Court of Claims,
the term was sufficiently clear, but to the dissent in Carpenter and
Merians, it was "ambiguous if read alone."'108 Certainly, the term
tax counsel standing by itself is strong language, sufficiently so
to sustain the holdings of all three cases: Davis, Carpenter, and
Merians. It should be borne in mind that regulations are presumed
to reflect the general understanding of the intended scope of a
Code section at the time of its enactment. 09 For this reason, the
regulations are entitled to great weight and must be sustained un-
less they are unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the sta-
tute.1
10
If the proposed regulations under section 212(3) had not been
specifically amended, tax-related expense deductions, at least inso-
far as that section is concerned, would have been limited to tax re-
106. See Palmquist v. United States, 284 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1967);
Munn Jr. v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9255 (Ct. Cl. 1972); George
v. United States, 434 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Matthews v. United States,
425 F.2d 738 (Ct. CL. 1970); Lyta J. Morris, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1248(1966); Rev. Rul. 72-545, 1972-2 Cum. BU-L. 8.
107. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); Arthur D.
McDonald, 52 T.C. 82 (1969); Meyer J. Fleischman, 45 T.C. 439 (1966).
108. Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366, 371-72 (Ct. CL. 1964) (dis-
senting opinion), and Merians, 60 T.C. 187, 197 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
109. Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1919); Augustus
v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 38, 43 (6th Cir. 1941).
110. Supra note 39.
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turn preparation and tax contests. Assuming Congress intended
all non-trade or non-business tax expenses to be deductible under
section 212(3) or not at all, then such a regulation, arguably,
would have had the anomalous result of disallowing some deduc-
tions under the 1954 Code which had been allowed under section
23 (a) (2) of the 1939 Code.111 On the other hand, if Congress did
not intend the specific tax provisions of section 212(3) to preclude
deducting appropriate tax-related expenses under the general pro-
visions of section 212(1) and 212(2), the proposed regulations sim-
ply would have reflected Congressional intent to only extend the
range of deductible tax-related expenses beyond the 1939 Code by
allowing the deductibility of gift tax expenses. Arguably, this
latter result would be consistent in spirit with the Supreme Court's
dicta in Gilmore that section 212(3) " . . . does not cast any doubt
on the basic tax structure set up by Congress."11 2
The logical inference to be drawn from the Treasury's amendment
of the proposed regulations is that at least the Treasury under-
stood section 212(3) to preempt sections 212(1) and 212(2) with re-
spect to non-trade and non-business tax-related expenses, but it is
debatable whether this premise justified the insertion of language
as broad as "tax counsel." As suggested previously, a fair reading
of the legislative record under section 212 (3) in the context of the
judicial and administrative law immediately preceding its enact-
ment, does not reveal a general consensus as to the intended scope
of section 212(3). For that matter, the language of the statute it-
self would not lead one to believe that tax advice regardless of its
nature is deductible under that section. In fact, the government's
restrictive construction in Carpenter of both section 212(3) and
the regulations would seem to indicate that the government never
intended "tax counsel" to take on the breadth given to it by Davis
and its progeny.
In essense, the government's approach to the regulation was this:
To take a few words from their context and with them thus iso-
lated to attempt to determine their meaning, certainly would not
contribute greatly to the discovery of the purpose of the drafts-
man of a statute....
111. See Gibbs, supra note 67, at 659; Hearings on H.R. 8300 before the
Senate Finance Committee, supra note 73.
112. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 n.16 (1963).
S.. A few words of general connotation appearing in the text
of statutes should not be given wide meaning, contrary to a settled
policy 'excepting as a different purpose is plainly shown.' 113
Nevertheless, whatever understanding of the scope of section 212
(3) inspired the draftsman of the amended regulations under that
section, to the Court of Claims in Davis and Carpenter, a fair and
natural reading of the regulatory language, though not necessarily
the statutory language of section 212(3), mandated a result that ad-
mittedly made new law.
Due perhaps in part to the influence of the ABA's Tax Section"14
and interested CPA's,1" 5 the Commissioner has since conceded the
deductibility of tax counsel in areas other than divorce and separa-
tion."6
NON-DEDUCTIBLE TAX PLANNING EXPENSES UNDER SECTION 263
An area that has not been rendered academic by administrative
concession is the relationship of section 212(3) to section 263,11 the
latter requiring the capitalization of certain expenditures, princi-
pally those incurred in acquiring or disposing of property and in de-
fending or perfecting title to property." 8 Treasury regulation sec-
tion 1.212-1(n) provides that "capital expenditures are not allow-
able as non-trade or non-business expenses.""19 The question raised
by this regulation in the context of section 212(3) is whether the
latter section precludes characterization of a non-trade or non-
business tax-related expenditure as a section 263 capital expendi-
ture.
113. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 542, 544
(1940).
114. See 20 ABA TAx SECTION No. 4, at 78-79 (1967); 19 ABA TAx SECTION
No. 4, at 86 (1966); 21 THE TAx LAWYER 708 (1968).
115. See De Castro, supra note 21; Kabaker, Deductibility of Estate Plan-
ning Fees, 54 ILL. B.J. 726 (1966); Scott, supra note 67.
116. See Suter v. United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9389 (S.D. N.Y. 1970)
(taxpayer incurred legal fees in proceedings to reinstate himself as benefi-
ciary of trust); Rev. Rul. 67-461, 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 125 (appraisal fee to
determine fair market value of property for charitable contribution under
section 170 (a) ); cf. Rev. Rul. 58-180, 1958-1 Cum. BuLL. 153 (appraisal fee
to establish casualty loss on residential property). But see Dooley v. Com-
missioner, 332 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1964) (district court disallowed a deduction
under section 212(3) for fees paid to a Boston broker who unsuccessfully
devised tax-saving schemes involving the supposed deductibility of interest
on loans to finance the purchase of government securities.)
117. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 263 providing that: "No deduction shall be
allowed for-(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent
improvements made to increase the value of any property or estate."
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a), (c), (e) (1958).
119. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(n) (1957).
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In Kaufmann v. United States,120 a case decided after Gilmore
but before Carpenter, this issue was dodged by the district court
which relied exclusively on the applicability of section 212(3) to
certain tax-related expenditures. In that case, two members of a
closely held corporation, which engaged in the small loan business
under the name of Commerce Loan Company, were allowed deduc-
tions under section 212(3) for accountant's fees incurred incident
to an agreement whereby all of the common and preferred stock
held by the common stockholders of Commerce would be exchanged
for stock in American Investment Company. The services per-
formed by the accounting firm included the following: 1) re-
searching the tax aspects of the various plans for the stock ex-
change; 2) preparing an application for a tax ruling; 3) conferring
with representatives of the Reorganization and Dividend Branch
of the IRS; and 4) computing the basis of two classes of stock re-
ceived by the taxpayers in the exchange.
The Commissioner had disallowed the entire amount on the
ground that it constituted a capital expenditure which must be
added to the cost of the acquired stock in American. Instead of pur-
suing the Comissioner's section 263 capitalization theory, the gov-
ernment's contention was simply that such expenses were outside
the scope of section 212(3) since the accountant's functions " . . .
were not and could not be a determination of the extent of the tax-
payer's liability."' 21 Just as it later did in Carpenter, the govern-
ment supported its argument that section 212(3) was limited to
actual contested tax liability by citing the legislative history of that
section.
As summarily set forth in the Kaufmann decision, the apparent
disparity between the committee report and the statutory language
persuaded the court to completely disregard the committee report
and pioneer its own interpretation of section 212(3). The court
looked to the same clause in the regulations that the Court of
Claims in Davis had relied upon, even though the court considered
that decision not to be controlling since it had not involved an ad-
vance ruling by the IRS. To the court's way of reasoning, the
sole purpose of the advance ruling was the computation of tax lia-
120. 227 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
121. Id. at 813.
bility, 'and so it logically followed that that portion of the accoun-
tant's fee properly allocable to the tax ruling, was dearly within
the meaning of the regulatory language, and therefore deductible.
But as to the determination of the stock basis, it was not for the
determination of any tax, said the court, but rather for the informa-
tion or possible future use of the taxpayer. For this reason, that
portion of the accountant's fees allocable to the basis determination
was non-deductible. It has been argued by several commenta-
tors122 that the court's rationale for denying a deduction for this
portion of the fee was inconsistent with its approach in sustaining
the deductibility of the cost of obtaining the Bureau's ruling. Since
the ruling was obtained prior to the completion of the stock trans-
action, strictly speaking, it likewise was obtained merely for the
taxpayer's information and future use.
The significance of Kaufmann lies not so much in the district
court's analysis of the scope of section 212(3), but rather in the
court's failure even to address the question of whether a portion if
not all of the accountant's expenses should have been capitalized.1 2 3
In discussing the tax ruling, the court made this observation:
I think it would not be disputed that the very purpose of setting
up the Reorganization and Dividend Branch of the Tax Ruling
Division ... was to advise interested parties of the tax liability
arising from a reorganization, such as we are dealing with here.
It would seem to be as much of a business expense to deter-
mine that question as to determine the actual tax liability after
the reorganization.12 4
Arguably, the court's dicta is subject to challenge in the wake of
the recent Supreme Court decisions in Woodward v. Commis-
sioner,125 and its companion case, United States v. Hilton Ho-
tels.120
122. De Castro, supra note 21; Kabaker, supra note 115; Scott, supra
note 67; Note, supra note 41.
123. In James A. Collins, 54 T.C. 1656, 1666 (1970), the taxpayer sought
to deduct tax advice procured in connection with the tax consequences of
an apartment house purchase: the Tax Court specifically considered this
issue of the capitalization of non-trade or non-business tax advice, and held
the expenditures to be deductible under section 212(3). By contrast, in
Leslie Q. Coupe, 52 T.C. 394, 414 (1969), where the taxpayers sought to
deduct legal fees incurred for tax advice in connection with the sale and
acquisition of realty, the court summarily concluded: "Both fees pertain to
a capital transaction and can therefore only represent a part of the basis of
the property acquired, or a selling expense of the property sold." Compare
Michael J. Ippolito, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec., par. 65,167 (1965) where the
Tax Court reversed the Commissioner's disallowance of deductions for
expenses incurred for financial and tax advice incident to the purchase of
treasury certificates.
124. Kaufmann v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 807, 814 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
125. Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
126. United States v. Hilton Hotels, 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
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Although the fact situations in these companion cases are distin-
guishable,12 7 both cases involved the deductibility of litigation ex-
penses incident to an appraisal of stock. The Court unanimously
held in each case that such costs constituted non-deductible capital
expenditures. After rejecting the applicability of the "primary
purpose" test1 28 to costs incurred in acquiring or disposing of capi-
tal assets, the Court predicated its decisions on the Gilmore "origin
and character of the claim" test. This latter test, said the Court,
involves the ". . . simple inquiry whether the origin of the
claim litigated is in the process of acquisition itself.' 29 Both of
these cases pertained to the capitalization of litigation expenses, but
the fair import of the Court's language suggests that any expenses
originating in the process of acquisition must be capitalized.
Certainly, it is arguable that the accountant's fees in Kaufmann
which were incurrred pursuant to negotiations with the IRS and
computing the basis of stock, were as much as part of the process
of stock acquisition as the ministerial transfer of stock certificates
themselves. Woodward contains dicta supporting such an argu-
ment: "[I] n this case there can be no doubt that legal, accounting,
and appraisal costs incurred by taxpayers in negotiating a purchase
of the minority stock would have been capital expenditures."'' 0
Thus, even though the Kaufmann expenses were tax-related and
'arguably within the provisions of section 212(3), the interrela-
tionship of the accountant's services with the stock purchase agree-
ment satisfied the Woodward-Hilton capitalization test, and would
presumably be non-deductible capital expenditures.
127. In Woodward, taxpayer shareholders of the Telegraph Herald, an
Iowa publishing corporation, sought to deduct litigation expenses incurred
in connection with the appraisal and valuation of stock, which they were re-
quired by law to purchase from a minority shareholder who objected to re-
newal of the corporation's charter. Hilton, on the other hand, involved the
deductibility of litigation expenses incurred by the taxpayer Hilton Hotels
Corporation in connection with a post-merger valuation of stock, which was
to be transferred by Hilton to dissenting shareholders of Hotel Waldorf-
Astoria Corporation.
128. This test was promulgated with respect to expenditures incurred
in defending or perfecting title to property; i.e., such expenses are capital
in nature only where the taxpayer's "primary purpose" in incurring them is
to defend or perfect title. See generally 4A J. MERTENS, LAW or FEDERAL
INcoAsa TAXATioN, §§ 25.24, 25A.16 (rev. ed. 1966) and the cases collected
therein.
129. Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 577 (1970).
130. Id. at 577-78.
Interestingly, concurrent with the expansion of the scope of sec-
tion 212(3) since Davis was decided, the scope of section 263 has
likewise been significantly broadened.131 Despite the Kaufmann
approach to the characterization of non-trade or non-business tax-
related expenditures, the deductibility of such expenses in connec-
tion with the acquisition or disposition of assets such as in Kauf-
mann, will no longer depend exclusively on whether the expense
is squarely within the scope of section 212(3), but rather on the
applicability of the Woodward-Hilton capitalization formula.132
CONCLUSION
Given the result in Merians, the scope of section 212(3) is signifi-
cantly broad. To the extent the decision stands for the proposition
that tax advice regardless of its nature with respect to estate plan-
ning services is deductible under section 212(3), the Tax Court
made new law.133 Realistically, even if the concurring and dissent-
ing opinions in Merians are theoretically correct in asserting that
section 212(3) was unjustifiably expanded by the Court of Claims
in Davis and Carpenter, an administrative retreat from that posi-
tion would be unpopular from a public policy standpoint. It is dif-
ficult to predict what effect the Commissioner's acquiescence in
Merians will have on the scope of section 212(3) when this issue
is squarely presented to the Tax Court.
GEORGE L. BEVAN, JR.
131. See Vincent Boagni, Jr., 59 T.C. 708 (1973); Rev. Rul. 67-125, 1967-1
Cum. BULL. 31; Rev. Rul. 67-411, 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 124; Aronson, The
Characterization of Legal Fees as Deductible Expenses or Capital Expendi-
tures-A Need for Clarification in the Law, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 926 (1970);
Gibbs, Legal Fees: Supreme Court Cases Requiring Capitalization will have
Broad Impact, 33 J. TAXATION 201 (1970); Winokur, Deductibility of Legal
and Other Professional Fees, U. So. CAL. 1963 TAx INST. 457.
132. But see Comment, Tax-Advice: A Deductible Expense, 10 VnL. L.
R v. 357, 364 (1965) where the author suggests that section 263 was in-
tended to be inapplicable to non-trade or non-business tax-related expendi-
tures.
133. See also Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947); Arthur D.
McDonald, 52 T.C. 82 (1969) (insufficient evidence); George L. Schultz,
50 T.C. 688 (1968).
